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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BLAIR SORENSON,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15916

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and JEFFERY LYNN NELSON,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent nelson sought benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for injuries which he alleges he suffered
while performing certain projects for appellant.
DISPOSITION BY THF. INDUSTRIAL C0"4MISSION
The evidence was heard by Kenneth Rigtrup, Administrative Law Judge, on March 15, 1976.

The Order of the Industrial

Commission was signeQ by Joseph C. Foley, Administrative Law
Judge, on April 14, 1978 in which respondent Nelson was awarded
compensation pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The

Commission denied appellant's Motion For Review on June 19,
1973.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant asks the court to reverse the order
of the Industrial Commission or to remand the cause for a
full hearing and determination by a single Administrative Law
Judge
STATEME~T

OF FACTS

Appellant Blair Sorenson was, at all times pertinent
to this case (February 1975 - August 1975), a full-time electric(
at Hill Air Force Base (R. 99).

In addition, Mr. Sorenson

owned as investments ten pieces of real estate on which apartments or houses were situated (R. 126).
I

Respondent Jeffery L. Nelson was, at all times perti-[
nent to this case, either a full-time student (R. 66), a full- r
time eDLployee of various construction companies (R. 76, 77, 78),
or unemployed

(R. 77, 78).

In addition, He 1 son completed

five projects for appellant at various investment properties
owned by appellant.
In February, 1975 Sorenson met Nelson in a class t~
were taking together at the University of Utah (R. 71).

At

that time, Nelson was a full-time student looking for parttime work as a carpenter (R. 71).

.Sorenson, upon discovering

that Nelson was a carpenter, asked Nelson if he would like to
give him a bid on a fire-burned floor in one of Sorenson's
apartments

(R. 103, 104).

Nelson stated that he would do the

work for $4. 00 per hour, but Sorenson let the work out to an

I
- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

independent contractor

(R. 103).

The cost of the work was

covered by an insurance policy Sorenson had on his apartment
building (R. 103, 104).
On February 22, 1975 Nelson and Sorenson painted an
apartment that Sorenson owned

(540 East. Seventh South) and

Sorenson paid Nelson with a check for $18.00 (R. 34, 73, 107,
130).

The painting, which took approximately five hours, was

the first of the five jobs that Nelson was to complete (R. 34).
The second project was in March, 1975 when Nelson helped
Sorenson put a bathtub in an apartment (540 East Seventh South).
That project took approximately one hour and Sorenson paid
Nelson with a check for $5.00 (R. 38, 115).
In April, 1975 Nelson moved into one of Sorenson's
apartments

(R.

30).

After this point in time, all work done

by Nelson was credited to an outstanding debt he owed Sorenson
for rent.

Sorenson was, in all instances after April, 1975, simply

allowing Nelson to work off rent due by arranging projects
for Nelson to complete (R. 107, 129).
On June 7, 1975, Nelson, using his own tools, worked
four to five hours installing new sheetrock and soundboard
at a Sorenson-owned apartment located at 1125 Princeton (R. 43,
14, 74, 106, 107, 256).

Sorenson had met Nelson on the pre-

vious day at the Princeton location and Sorenson showed Nelson
what work needed to be done

(R.43).

Nelson, having the necessary

skills and equipment, completed the project by himself without
any direction from Sorenson

(R. 75, 256).
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Nelson finished the Spring quarter at the University
of Utah on June 10, 1975 and went to work for Bishop's Castles
as a carpenter
July 7, 1975

(R. 76).

(R. 76).

Nelson was employed there until
Around July 4, 1975, Nelson helped

Sorenson install a new kitchen cabinet in Sorenson's 1144 ~~
Fifth South apartments

(R. 78).

The project was completed

over several days with the work being done on a part-time basis
(R. 46).

From July 7, 1975 to August 1, 1975, Nelson was
unemployed

(R. 77, 78).

At the end of July, 1975 Nelson com-

pleted the fifth project that Sorenson had given him.

Nelson

and Sorenson painted one of the apartments in the structure
located at 1144 East Fifth South (R. 47, 48).

On August 1,

1975 Nelson went to work full-time with the Ron J. Stacey

Construction Company, where he remained employed until August
15, 1975 (R. 51, 67).

llelson quit his job with Stacey believin·

that he would soon have another job as a carpenter with Kahley I
Construction Company (R. 86).
On August 27, 1975 Nelson undertook a project which
Sorenson described to him the day before

(R.

52, 122, 123) ·

.

I

Sorenson told Nelson that the buildina at 1144 East Fifth Soutr
needed to be prepared for painting

an~

that Nelson should scra;:/

and wash the building (R. 88, 122, 123).

Nelson, on August 27

1

and 29, proceeded to scrape and wash down tl1e building in the
manner and using the method which he chose.

Nelson was not to'.I

by Sorenson how he was to complete the project or when he was
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to work on it.

Sorenson only instructed Nelson to complete

the project (R. 49, 90, 122, 123).
On August 29, 1975 Nelson, while scrubbing down
the apartment building, fell off the ladder he was using and
suffered injuries to his right arm and leg, such injuries
resulting in a claim filed with the Industrial Commission
for workmen's compensation (R. 55).
Summarizing the circumstances surrounding the
activities of Nelson and Sorenson, Nelson only worked for
Sorenson on a part-time weekend basis (R. 86).

Sorenson knew

of Nelson's full-time jobs and the fact that Nelson was looking for full-time employment with construction companies
during periods of unemployment (R. 91).

Nelson was never told

that there was any definite amount of work or projects available (R. 124, 144).

Nelson stated that no definite time period

was ever mentioned by Sorenson regarding how long projects would
remain available to be worked on (R. 91).

Nelson supplied his

own tools when he was completing carpentry projects while
Sorenson only supplied tools and materials for painting projects
completed by Nelson (R. 256) .
Sorenson worked full time for Hill Air Force Base
during all times pertinent to the case (R. 99).

In addition,

Sorenson was attending the University of Utah as a fu.11-time
student (R. 124).

Sorenson's 19 rental units on ten pieces of

real estate are simply investments (R. 126).

The minimum

amount of upkeep required has been handled by Sorenson or
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contracted out to independent contractors

(R. 120, 132).

(NJ

references to "respondent" in Argument sections that follow
are to Jeffery Nelson, unless otherwise noted.)
ARGUME:1T

I.
THE ORDER OF THE INDUST~IAL comuSSION SHOULD
BE REVERSBD SINCE APPELLANT WAS NOT AN E!1PLOYER
AS DEFINED UNDER sr:CTION 35 1-42 OF THE \vORK'1F.NS
COMPENSATION ACT

The Workmen's Compensation Code, Section 35-1-42,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), expressly provides the following
definition of an employer:
"Every person, firn and private corporation,
including every public utility, having in
service one or more workmen or operatives
regularly employed in the same business, or
in or about the same establishment, under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, except agricultural laborers and
domestic service;
"The term 'regularly' as herein used shall
include all employment in the usual course of
the trade, business, profession or occupation of
the employer, whether continuous throughout the
year or for only a portion of the year."
It is the contention of appellant that the ovmership
and maintenance of his rental units is an investment and not a
business within the meaning of the aforementioned Workmen's
Compensation Code.

The Supreme Court of Utah, in Sommerville

·I

v. Industrial Cornm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948), reaches,
a similar conclusion.

In that case, plaintiff, the claimant

under the Workmen's Compensation Act, was injured while workinc

I

I

on a building owned by the defendant and leased to another for
retail grocery business.

The defendant hired the plaintiff'
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course of such work was injured.

The Court determined that

the defendant, who earned her livelihood as a restaurant owner,
was not engaged in the real estate or rental business as that
term is used within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and stated:
"It is true that the property upon which
plaintiff was working when he was injured
\vas rental property from which presumably
Hrs. Cook derived some income. But there
is nothing in the record to indicate that
she spent any substantial portion of her
time in managing or operating this property, and it was not part of her trade
or business within the meaning of the
statute.
It was a matter of investment.
See Clausen v. Dinnebeil, 125 N.J.L. 223,
15 A.2d 205; Ostile v. H. F. Kirks & Son,
189 Minn. 34, 248 N.W. 283; Ford v.
Industrial Acc. Comm., 53 Cal. App. 542,
200 P.667; Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan.
447, 37 P.2d 50; and Annotation at 50 A.L.R.
1176.
"This is not to say that one may not be
engaged in two or more businesses, or a
profession or trade and a business at the
same time, and be responsible under the
Workmen's Compensation Act in both or all
fields of activity.
Nor do we hold that
the owning and operating of real estate for
rental purposes may not, in some instances, be
a business within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Our holding is
limited to the facts of this case, i.e., that
where a person owns one piece of real estate
which he 'rents out' to tenants, but does
not either personally or by agent devote a
substantial amount of time to the operation
or management of such property, the owning
and renting of such property does not constitute a business within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
"Therefore, Mrs. Cook was engaged in the
coffee shop business, and the building upon
which plaintiff was working at the time of
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his injury was wholly disconnected from
and unrelated to that business.
Since
we have held that the o~ming and renting
of this property did not constitute 'a
trade, business or occupation', within
the meaning of the Act, and since this
property was in no wise connected with
the coffee shop business, it follows
that the services being rendered by
palintiff at the time of this accident was
not necessary to, in furtherance of or a part
of plaintiff's usual trade, business, or
occupation, and, hence under the rules and
definitions previously laid down by this
court, his employnent (if he were an employee
at all) would be only casual, and therefore
he would not be entitled to compensation
under the act." (196 P.2d at 721)
The case further dealt with the question of whether

j

plaintiff's relationship to the defendant was that of an employee or an independent contractor.

The Court in this regard

found the applicant to be an independent contractor since defen·
dant did not attempt to control the work in any particular
manner, but on the contrary, merely showed the plaintiff and
another what work she wanted done and left it entirely up to .

·.I

plaintiff as to the method or manner of accomplishing the desu 0
result.

The defendant, however, did supply all of the tools

and materials needed for the job and agreed to pay plaintiff
on an hourly basis.

The Court, notwithstanding these facts,

held:
"It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that the crucial factor in determining whether an applicant for workmen's compensation is an employee or an
independent contractor is whether or not
the person for whom the services were
performed had the right to control the
execution of the work.
See the recent
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case of Christean v. Industrial Comm'n.,
Utah, 196 P.2d 502, reviewing most of the
Utah cases on this question." (196 P.2d
at 720)
An authoritative case concerning the issue of whether

the renting of apartments if deemed to be a business within
\Vorkmen's Compensation is Marsh v. Groner, 102 A.127
The facts involved therein are relatively simple.

(Pa., 1917).

The defendant

was a married woman residing with her husband in a house owned
by herself, and in the course of enlarging and remodeling this
home engaged the plaintiff to do some plastering work about the
premises, which would have required at most a couple of days to
complete.

The claimant had been engaged in work for only a

short period of time when the scaffolding on which he was standing gave way and he fell to the ground, sustaining injuries.
The Court stated:
"It is an indispensable condition to his
recovery under this act that the claimant
show that he received his injury while engaged in the regular course of the business
of his employer.
Section 104 of the act reads:
"'The term "employee" [sic], as used in this
act, is declared to be synonymous with servant,
and includes all natural persons who perform
services for another for a valuable consideration, e;.(clusive of persons whose employment
is casual in character and not in the regular
course of the business of the employer.'
"We derive from this by necessary implication
that onlv such employers are made liable under
the act ;;s are themselves engaged in regular
business.
This must be so if any effect
whatever is to be given the exclusion clause
. . . What gives rise to the question is the
indefiniteness and want of precision of meaning of the word 'business' as it occurs in
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the act.
It is a word which enbraces a wide
variety of subjects, and, being without a
technical or precise meaning, excluding any
other, it may convey an entirely different
meaning in one connection from what it imports when used in another . . . It would
be a very exceptional person--we do not know
how to otherwise describe him--who would not
understand that the reference is to the
habitual or regular occupation that the
party was engaged in with a view to winning
a livelihood or some gain.
These objects
are necessarily implied when one's business
is spoken of.
Eliminate them, livelihood
and gain, arid it is no longer business, but
amusement, which no one ever confounds with
business
" (102 A. 2d at 128).
Clearly, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence
establishes that the appellant in the present case, while the
owner of several apartment units, operated such property at a
loss in excess of $4,000 for 1975.

Appellant's livelihood and

income was derived from his employment as an electronic tech·
nician at Hill Air Force Base.

Therefore, it cannot be conclude

that the renting of apartment units is any more than a passive I
investment when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstance

I

establishing the limited amount of time spent by appellant in
managing such units and the lack of income therefrom.
Numerous other states have determined that the mere
owning of a building, maintaining it and keeping it in repair [
so that it may produce income is not sufficient to constitute
trade or business within the l\lorkmen' s Compensation Act.
v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 37 P.2d 50 (1934), and Ford v.
Comm'n, 53 Cal. App. 542, 200 P.667

~1
Ind~

(1921), wherein the Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 10 -

cf

I

held that an owner who lets his house for profit and at
irregular times when demanded has labor performed in the repair
thereof is not engaged in the pursuit of a "trade" or "business"
within the Workmen's Compensation Act.

As the Court stated:

[T]he petitioner herein had no business
other than renting the building for profit.
Upon the authority thereof we can but repeat that where an individual invests his
money in a house or houses which as owner he
lets for profit, and at irregular times when
demanded has labor performed in the repair
thereof, he is not engaged in the prosecution of a trade or business, within the
meaning of the act and upon which a charge
as compensation for injury sustained by an
employee casually engaged in doing such work
can be imposed."
(200 P. 668)
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Billmayer v.
Sanford, 225 N.W. 426, held that a woman owning rental property
accommodating some eight or nine tenants was not engaged in
business within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act
when the claimant, who was hired to perform certain work on
such property, was injured.

The Court specifically held that

the owning and letting of these houses did not constitute a
In addition, the Court determined that the plaintiff,

business.

who was engaged to perform certain work on the rental property
on a daily basis for approximately three weeks, was engaged in
"casual employment" within the meaning of the Workmen's Campensation Act.

The Court stated:

" • . • A thing is casual when it comes without regularity and is of comparatively minor
importance.
It is usually temporary and of
short duration. Where the employment cannot
be characterized as permanent or periodi-
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cally regular, but occurs by chance, or
with the intention and understanding
on the part of both employer and employee
that it shall not be continuous, it is
casual.
"Relator did not need a regular employee.
She had some odd jobs to be done.
They
were of unknown but short duration.
She
was not carrying on any business or occupation.
The employment was necessarily
understood by both parties as temporary.
It could not be continuous.
It was a mere
incident.
It was an occasional irregular
employment.
The very nature of the work
leads to the conclusion that the employment
was cas•<1l.
The \'Tork was of a casual nature.
Where one is not employed in a business,
trade, occupation, or profession, the employee
is not within the act unless his employment
is stable."
(225 N.W. at 427)
The uncontradicted facts of the instant case show that i
respondent in the past was employed on a casual basis and had no
reasonable anticipation of working on any continuing basis for
appellant.

In fact, the job in question was never completed,

and no additional work of any sustained nature was performed by
appellant on his rental property for the balance of the year
after respondent's accident on August 29, 1975.

Moreover, resp::!

dent admitted that he was actively seeking full-time employment

J

I
and had an application outstanding at the time for work with a
general contractor in this area.
Other jurisdictions holding that the mere renting and
repairing of rental uni ts is not a business within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation statute are as follows:

~I

Dinnebeil, 125 N.J.L. 223, 15 A.2d 205; People ex rel

Voel~I

Browne, 52 N.Y.S.2d 822, 268 App. Div. 596.

see al so in this ,
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regard 50 A.L.R. 1176, An~otation, listing those cases holding
that an owner of rental property is not engaged in a business.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morgan v. Salt Lake City,
78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510

(1931), was faced with the situation of

whether a statute authorizing a municipality to collect a
license fee from a private corporation or business was applicable
to a person maintaining a room open to the public where cards
were being played.

The Court, in determining that this was not

a business within the meaning of the licensing statute, held
that:
"What ordinarily is meant by the term 'business'? It is a pursuit or occupation in
which a person is engaged to procure a living.
It is synonymous with calling, occupation, or
trade, and is defined as any particular
occupation or employment habitually engaged
in for a livelihood or gain."
It is submitted that the issue of whether the renting
of apartment units constitutes a business must be evaluated in
light of the time spent by the apartment owner in managing the
business and the income, if any, realized from such pursuit.
In the event that a person is not engaged in the buying and
selling of realty but rather in investing in land and real
estate for income purposes, it is no more than a passive
investment.

This is buttressed by the fact that a relatively

small portion of appellant's time is actually spent in the
management of apartm2nt units.

In fact, appellant's full-time

occupation requires approximately ten hours of his time and
school requires 12 to 15 hours per week, leaving very little

-13-
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time left for the man;,ement of another business.
When all of the facts and circumstances are viewed,
·
it must be concluded that the renting of apartment units does
not constitute a business within the meaning of the \·lorkmen's
Compensation Act.
II.

RESPONDENT WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTR.A..CTOR AS
DEFINED UND!::R THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

The uncontradicted facts establish that respondent,
while engaged in work on August 27 and August 29, 1975, was
performing work pursuant to an understanding that he would
receive a $4 per hour credit on rent which he was obligated to
pay appellant but that the time and manner in which the work
was to be performed was not controlled by appellant.

The

Supreme Court of Utah, in numerous cases, has held that the
test of an employment relationship is whether the employer
retains supervision and control over the work to be performed.
See Weber County-Ogden City Relief Committee v. Industrial Com.93 Utah 85, 71 P.2d 177
Utah 468, 136 P.2d 945

(1937); Overman v.

Industrial Cornm'n, 1

(1943); Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Colfu1'

113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245

(1948).

The fact situation in the present case comes square!;
within the ruling of the Sommerville case, supra.

The respond'

retained control over when his working l'eriods begun and ended
notwithstanding the fact that the supplies and materials were
Ilk•de available by appellant.

At no time during the day of
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'1

nd:

ed,

August 27 did appellant supervise or control t!'le work performed
by respondent, and when the work was continued on August 29, it

was done on the same basis.
The clear understanding between the parties was that
respondent would receive $4 per hour credit for work performed.
The facts therefore conclusively establish that respondent was
an independent contractor rather than an employee of appellant.
This is further supported by the previous employment history of
respondent which involved unsupervised work involving either
his performance of carpentry work, in which he is an experienced
journeyman, or in simple manual tasks, none of which required
the direct supervision of appellant.
It is further submitted that the work performed by
respondent in most cases was work performed in order to reduce
a pre-existing debt, i.e., the payment of rent to appellant.
In fact, with the exception of two checks--one for $18 and one
for $5 paid in March of 1975--no money was paid by appellant to
respondent for work performed.

To hold that respondent was

an employee of appellant would subject all property owners dealing in rental properties on an investment basis as employers,
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was not contemplated by the legislators in the passage of such Act, and
would be in clear contravention of the precise wording and intent
of the statute and the law as enunciated in the Sommerville
case, supra.
Moreover, respondent was not receiving direct compensation
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for services rendered, as is generally the situation in an
employer-employee relationship.

See i;:i this regard Todd Sch

for Boys. v. Industrial Comrn'n, 107 N.E.2d 745

~
(Ill. 1952).

In Oberhansly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Utah 2d 15,
295 P.2d 1093 (1956), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under
the Workmen's Compensation Act it is essential that in resolvin
an employee-employer relationship that some consideration be ir.
fact paid or payable to an employee since the term employee
indicates a person hired to work for wages as the employer may
direct.
In the instant case, respondent was not to

receive~

direct compensation but rather a reduction in his rent, and it
cannot be said that he was working for consideration within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
III.
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD
BE REVERSED SINCE Al?PELLAN'!' WAS DENIED THE
RIGHT TO HAVE A DECISION RENDERED BY THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHO HEARD THE EVIDENCE
The appellant submits that the Administrative Law
Judge's Findings of Fact, enumerated 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which
relate to factual determinations concerning the question of
whether or not the respondent was or was not an independent con·
tractor, are erroneous.

The appellant, through testimony,

established that the respondent was a journeyman carpenter and
that while certain work was performed at the direction of the
defendant, the manner and means by which the work was to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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performed was not controlled or directed by the appellant, and
that on most occasions the respondent supplied his own tools and
was not always paid on an hourly basis.
It is axiomatic in the cormnon law that the single most
important criterion to be employed in evaluating the question
of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor
is whether or not the appellant attempts to control or direct
the actual execution of the work being performed or, rather, is
in effect purchasing the end result.
It is the appellant's position that the facts bearing
on this issue were presented to the Administrative Law Judge,
Kenneth Rigtrup, who did not issue the Findings of Fact in the
instant decision because of his termination of service with the
Industrial Commission.

It is well established that as a matter

of due process, the defendant is entitled to a decision by the
Administrative Law Judge who has heard the conflicting testimony
and can make appropriate credibility resolutions.

In Crow v.

Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321 (1943), the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission in a
similar situation and stated:
"This case, however, must be reversed for
another reason. Commissioner Jugler, the
only Commissioner who heard the evidence
and saw the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying did not participate in the decision, and as far as the record discloses,
he made no findings, either written or oral,
which made his opinion of the evidence
available to the Commission in making its
decision. Where, as in this case, the
evidence is not entirely documentary and
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there is sharp conflict in the evidence,
the credibility, or lack thereof, of the
witnesses is of paramount importance.
Only
a person who actually hears and sees a
witness while testifying is in a position
to determine the weight of credibility which
be given to such testimony.
The opinion of
such person is a necessary factor in making any findings of fact.
This situation
is analogous to that of a judg~ who has
tried a case, sitting without a jury, and
whose office is either terminated or he
resigns or dies before he has made the findings of fact and conclusions of law. As
stated in Case v. Fox, et al, 138 Ore. 453,
7 P.2d 267, Pg. 268, '
. we can readily
perceive that a successor to a trial judge
who was removed by death before he had announced any findings of fact, or had in any
other manner announced judgment upon the cause,
could not render findings of fact . .
'"
For the reasons advanced above, appellant further oijects to the findings set forth in paragraphs 10 and 11 of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

t~

Simple justice requi:

that the Administrative Law Judge who heard the disputed testi:'
concerning appellant's disability should decide such issue.
While the appellant did not object to the findings of the Medi:
Panel, it is also manifest that the Commission can consider te'
many of the respondent that he engaged in certain sporting acti
ties while allegedly totally disabled and respondent's doctor''
statement to the effect that the respondent had no permanent
disability.

It is not clear from the decision if such informa

was considered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Since the

Administrative Law Judge was not present during the testimony
the respondent and the appellant, any finding concerning the
extent of disability, either permanent or partial, is suspect
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and should be reversed.
The appellant further submits that the rate of compensation set forth in the Order was established without the taking
of testimony in the presence of appellant concerning the average
weekly wage of the respondent who was only casually engaged in
work.
IV.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO EST.II.BLISH THE :·1ATURE AND
EXTENT OF HIS INJURIES IN FRONT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAKING THE FINAL
DECISION
It is the position of the appellant that the respondent
has not met his burden of proof and has failed to establish
the nature and extent of his injuries through competent medica_l
evidence nor the extent of any alleged permanent or partial
disability.

At the hearing there was no medical evidence

presented, and furthermore, the facts establish that within two
weeks after the cast was removed from responde!lt's right hand he
went on a hunting trip.

His testimony, however, is that he

cannot engage in any gainful employment and bases this on no
more than his subjective testimony that his wrist hurts when
he engages in certain kinds of activity.

It is appellant's posi-

tion that the respondent should establish the nature and extent
of his injury and any disability connected therewith in front of
the Administrative Law Judge who will hear the conflicting testimony and make the appropriate Findings of Fact.

Moreover, an

opportunity to review such findings in front of the AdmiTI~strative
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Law Judge making the Findings of Fact should be afforded the
appellant since the existence of a disability is, in the
opinion of appellant, in dispute.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's investments in nineteen rental units do
not constitute a business and, thus, appellant is not an emplo;'
under Section 35-1-42 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

To

hold otherwise would subject the appellant and people similar!;'
situated to requirements which would make the ownership of reai
property investments impractical.

The Utah court, in the

Sommerville case, recognized the possibility of such an inequi'.'
able result and held that the defendant was engaged in the
business of managing a restaurant and owned the real estate
solely as an investment.

The reasoning of Sommerville should

be applied to the instant case.
Furthermore, respondent was an independent contracto:
who simply completed specified projects in whatever manner and
by whatever means he chose.

Appellant had no control over hm1

the work was performed or the time period in which it was to b;
completed.
Finally, due process considerations require a remand
since appellant was denied the opportunity to have a single
Administrative Law Judge render a decision on the facts and la'
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For the above reasons, the order of the Industrial
Commission should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

R?nald F. Sysak
~
ft'ttorneys for Appell.ii'nt,
/
Blair Sorenson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies,
postage prepaid, of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to counsel
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Hadley, Suite 300, 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah
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